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?BSTRACT
This paper examines the existence and nature ofcompetitive
equilibriumwith moral hazard. The more insurancean individual
has,the less care will he take. Consequently, insurancefirms
attempt to restrict their clients' aggregate insurancepurchases.
If individuals' aggregate insurance purchasesare observable,
each firm will ration the amount of insurance its clientscan
purchase and insist that they purchase no insurance from other
firms.
This paper focuses on the alternative situation where firms
cannot observe their clients' aggregate insurance purchases.We
show that firms will still attempt to restrict their clients'
aggregate purchases, but now they must do so indirectly. One
possibility is that all firms sell only policies with a
sufficiently large amount of coverage that individuals choose to
purchase insurance from only one firm. Another possibility is
that each firm offers a latent policy in addition to itsregular
policy. Latent policies are not purchased in equilibrium, but
serveto restrict entry. If an entering firmoffers a
supplementarypolicy, anindividual will purchase not only this
policy plus his previous policy but also the latent policy. The
latent policy is designed so that the individual reduces effort
by enough to render any entering policy unprofitable.
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I. Introduction
It is now widely recognized that moral hazard-incentive problems are pervasive in the
economy. In situations where moral hazard problems arise, firms make use of indirect control
mechanisms to alter behavior in the desired way. Among the most important are quantitative
limit.,. Insurers limit the amount of insurance which an insured can purchase, recognizing
that the more insurance he has, the less care will he take (Pauly, 1974). Lenders limit
the extent of indebtedness of a borrower, recognizing that the greater his indebtedness,
the more likely he is to take actions which result in default (Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)).
Employers, such as universities, limit their employees' outside employment (e.g. to one day
of consulting a week), recognizing that the level of effort exerted on behalf of the university
will be reduced by moonlighting. Landlords attempt to limit the employment of tenants
working under sharecropping contracts for similar reasons.
The effectiveness of these quantitative limitations depends on the information available.'
Universities often find it impossible to monitor outside consulting. Insurers find it difficult
to monitor insurance provided by others.2 Where firms and principals are unable to enforce
quantitative limits, there are other mechanisms they can employ to control indirectly quan-
tities. Insurers design their contracts to deter their customers from purchasing insurance
from others, and to deter other insurers from selling insurance to their customers. Similarly,
employers design their labor contracts to deter their employees from wanting to moonlight,
and to deter other employers from providing moonlighting opportunities.
The objective of this paper is to examine the existence and nature of market equilibrium
*Weaie grateful to the National Science Foundation, the Olin Foundation, the Hoover Institution, and
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support. We would like to
thank Oliver Hart, Martin Hellwig, Bentley MacLeod, Urs Schweizer, Thomas Von Ungern-Sternberg, and
seminar participants at the University of Pennsylvania for helpful comments. Remaining errors are our
responsibility.
This in turn depends on the cost of acquiring information, legal restrictions concerning what information
can be collected and how it may be acquired, the extent of communication between principals concerning
their agents' activities, etc.
2Thisis particularly true because insurance is provided not only by insurance firms, but also by other
institutions i our society. Sick leave provided by firms for their employees is a form of health insurance.
For a more extended discussion, see Arnott and Stigtitz (1990a).
2under these circumstances.3 We focus our analysis on the insurance market, because it
provides the simplest canonical model in which these questions can be examined. It should
be clear, however, that the general results obtained here apply in other contexts in which
moral hazard arises and direct quantitative restrictions are unenforceable.
Even when an insurer cannot monitor his clients' outside purchases of insurance, he can
monitor his own sales to them. By requiring his customers to purchase sufficiently large
policies, he might discourage them from purchasing insurance from other firms. We show
that, while firms will try to do this, this mechanism does not in general solve the over-
insurance problem which arises when quantities are unobservable. Also, the attempt to limit
the quantity of insurance may result in there being no Nash equilibrium in the market.
The actions which an individual takes to prevent the insured-against accident depend
on his total purchases of insurance; and his total purchases depend on the entire set of
insurance policies which are available to him. This introduces what turns out to be a powerful
commitment for deterring entry: An incumbent insurer can offer a set of latent insurance
policies, in addition to the policy he sells in equilibrium. These latent policies are not
purchased in equilibrium. But if an entrant offers a new policy which the incumbent's clients
find attractive enough to buy, they will also purchase the latent policies. Having purchased
a lot of additional insurance, they will reduce care, which will increase the probability of
accident by enough that the new policy makes a loss. We show that such latent insurance
policies are extremely effective in deterring entry, so effective that there exist positive profit
equilibria. Thus, while attempts to control the moral hazard problem by offering large
policies aimed at discouraging insurance purchases from other firms turn out not to be
successful, attempts to deter entry by offering latent policies turn out to be, in a sense, too
successful.
II. Model and Notation
We employ a very simple model in which individuals are identical (to abstract from
the adverse selection problem). There is a single, fixed-damage accident, the probability of
Important contributions to the literature on the topic include Pauly [1974], Helpman and Laffont j1975j
Stiglits [1983], and Heliwig [1983a,b].
3which, p, is a function of the level of effort devoted to accident avoidance, e. Moral hazard
arises because the insurer is unable to observe individuals' effort, and is hence unable to write
contracts contingent on effort; instead he must write insurance contracts contingent on which
of the two events,"accident" or "no accident," occurs. Then the more insurance he offers, the
lower the individual's effort; hence, there is a tradeoff between risk-bearing and incentives,
which is the hallmark of the moral hazard problem. In the absence of insurance and in the
event of no accident, the individual's consumption is w, while if there is an accident it is
w —d,where d is the accident damage. The insured individual receives a (the "(net) payout"
or "benefit") if an accident occurs, and if it does not he pays /3 (the "premium"). Thus,
yo=w—3 ,yi=w—d+cs, (11.1)
where y is consumption in the event of no accident, and Yi consumption in the event of
accident. The individual's expected utility is
EU =(1
—p(e))uo(yo,e)+ p(e)uj(y1,e) . (11.2)
We make the simplifying assumption that the expected utility has the form
EU =(1
—p(e))u(yo)+ p(e)u(yj) —e. (11.2')
This function is separable in consumption and effort, and is event-independent—which event
occurs does not affect the utility from consumption (the accident does not cause pain, nor
does it alter tastes). There is positive but diminishing marginal utility from consumption.
Also, we measure effort so that e =0corresponds to minimum effort and assume that p' < 0
and p" > 0 for e > 0, and p(O) <1(which rules out the possibility that the insured will
deliberately cause the accident.)
We shall develop our analysis in cs-/3 space. For the purpose of illustration, suppose that
insurance firms are offering quantity policies, which specify both a premium and a payout.
Diagrammatically, a positive quantity insurance policy is represented by a positively-sloped,
upward-pointing arrow (such as KR4 in Figure 11.1), and a negative quantity insurance
policy (one in which the individual pays if the accident occurs and receives a payout if it
does not) by a positively-sloped, downward-pointing arrow (such as KK2 in Figure 11.1). Anindividual's aggregate insurance purchases are obtained as the vector sum of all the policies
he purchases; thus, in terms of Figure II. I OK+ KKOK1 for example. We define q
to be the price of insurance corres iidingto(a, 13) (gcuiiictrically, itisthe slope of a ray
from the origin to (a,$)). a is the "quantity" of insurance.
An individual with aggregate insurance purchases characterized by (a,fi) chooses effort
to maximize expected utility; i.e.,
max EU =(1
—p(e))uo+ p(e)ui —eV(a,/3) , (11.3)
where uou(vJ —13)andu1u(w —d+ a). The first-order condition is
—(u0 —uj)p'(e)
—1=0if e > 0 . (11.4)
This gives e as a function of a and 3, e(a,13), which, under the assumption of separable
utility, is a continuous function of (a,/3).4 Furthermore,< 0 and< 0 for e > 0;
as more insurance is provided, the individual reduces effort. Substituting e(a,13) into the
expression for expected utility gives V(a, 13),theindifference curves corresponding to which
can be plotted in a-/3space.
The individual's marginal rate of substitution between the premium and net payout is
——h— tLjp •fJ5 ' V-'(1)
(.)
Asmore insurance is provided, diminishing marginal utility causesto decrease, but in-
dividuals take less care, and as a result increases. For this reason, indifference curves
between net payout and premium will not in general be convex5 (see Figure II.!). Because
of this, even though, under our assumptions, effort is a continuous function of (aj3), an
individual's purchases of insurance may not be a continuous function of, say, the price of
insurance. This greatly complicates the analysis to follow.
The set of aggregate, non-negative insurance purchases for which expected returns are
non-negative,
ir(a,/3)13(1— p(e(aj3)))—ap(e(a,B))￿ 0
'Theseparability assumption was made to circumvent analytical complexities which arise when effort is
not a continuous function of (a, 13) which may be the case with a nonseparable utility function; see Arnott
andStiglits(1988a).
We say thatindifferencecurves are convexwhenthey have the normal shape, even though in a —
spacenormally-shaped indifference curves are concave.
5is referred to as the feasibility set and denoted by .Theboundary of this set is referred
to as the resource constraint or zero profit locus(ZPL)(see Figure 11.1). As one moves
up the zero profit iocus, effort falls, the probability of accident increases, and to maintain
zero profits the ratiomust increase. The feasibility set is never convex. It is the lack of
convexity of the feasibility set, combined with the lack of quasiconcavity of V(cz,f3), which
give rise to the problems that are the concern of this paper.
It will be useful, before proceeding, to consider some aspects of the geometry of the prob-
1cm. First, because of the possible nonconvexity of indifference curves, price-consumption
lines and income-consumption lines can be discontinuous.6 This has important implications
for the analysis that follows. Second, because our assumption of separable utility implies that
with e > 0 effort falls as a orincreases, the probability of accident rises monotonically as
one moves up any ray from the origin. Third, the zero effort line (ZEL) is the locus of (aj3)
such that (uo —u)limiop'(e) + 1 =0(to simplify notation, we shall subsequently use p'(O)
$ '4 todenote limop (e), etc.) and has slopezEL Effort is zero everywhere beyond
the zero effort line. Fourth, the full insurance line (FIL), the locus of (a,/3) corresponding
to which the marginal utility of consumption is the same in the accident and no-accident
events, is defined implicitly by t4 =i4which with event-independence implies d =a+ f3. If
p'(O) =—oo,then u0 =iz1along the zero effort line, which, under our assumption of event-
independent utility, implies that the zero effort line coincides with the full insurance line. If,
however, p'(O) is finite, then u > u1 along the zero effort line, which with event-independent
utility implies that less than full insurance is provided along the zero effort line and that the
full insurance line lies outside the zero effort line, the case depicted in Figure 11.2.
A limiting case7 of this general model is that where there are two activities, a safe activity
ntid a riskyactivity;r roproactits tltcfrn.cti,,i,,,1 the iiiIividul'a Lime cngu.gocl in the safe
activity, and p(e) = ep' + (1 —e)p',where pa(pr) is the accident probability associated with
the safe (risky) activity. In this case, the indifference curves are never convex; they appear
as in Figure 11.3, where we have also drawn the zero profit locus.
The price-consumption line is defined in theusual wayas the locus of points of maximum utility on
price lines (rays through the origin). The income-consumption line is the locus of points of maximum utility
on parallel budget constraints.
This is a limiting case since p"(e) = 0.
6III. Definition of Equilibrium and the Nature of the Problem
111.1 Definilion of equilibrium
Equilibrium is defined in a similar way to Etothschild-Stiglitz [1976], which examined
equilibrium in insurance markets with adverse selection. Each firm offers a single insurance
contract in a class of admissible contracts, or does nothing. A Nash equilibrium in admissible
insurance contracts is defined as a set of admissible contracts such that: i) all contracts
offered at least break even; ii) taking as given the contracts offered by incumbent firms
(those offering contracts) there is no additional contract which if offered by an entering firm
(one not offering a contract) can make a strictly positive profit; and iii) taking as given the
set of contracts offered by other incumbent firms, no incumbent firm can increase its profits
by altering the contract it offers.
We term such contracts competitive because each insurance firm treats other firms anony-
mously and believes it will have no effect on other firms' actions (the standard Nash assump-
tion), because entry and exit are free, and because no barrier to entry or scale economies are
present.
It should be emphasized that equilibrium is defined conditional on the set of admissible
contracts. Thus, determining the appropriate equilibrium concept entails identifying the
appropriate set of admissible contracts. We shall define various equilibrium concepts, some
in which the set of admissible contracts is restricted exogeneously, and some in which the set
is restricted by the information available to insurers. Among the restrictions we consider are
those where the firm can restrict the total quantity of insurance a client purchases, where the
firm can restrict the quantity of insurance a client purchases from itself, and where the firm
can impose no quantity restriction. Other characteristics of the set of admissible contracts
which need to be specified are whether negative or stochastic (where, for example, the payout
is stochastic) insurance is allowed. Furthermore, it matters whether a contract contains only
a single, simple policy or instead a set of policies from which the client may mix and match,
and whether inactive (not purchased in equilibrium) policies are admitted.
We start out by imposing considerable restrictions on the set of admissible contracts,
and then gradually loosen these restrictions. To begin, we disallow negative and stochastic
7insurance, permit each company to offer only a single, simple policy in its contract, and
exclude inactive policies.
111.2 Exclusive contract and price equilibria: two limiting cases
If effort were observable, the natural set of admissible contracts would include those in
which payouts and premia are contingent on effort. The equilibrium in this case would be
(equivalent to) the standard competitive equilibrium. But we are concerned with situations
in which effort is not observable.
Though effort cannot be controlled directly, firms know that effort is affected by the
quantity of insurance. Hence, when firms can monitor either their clients' purchases of
insurance or payouts from other insurance firms,8 they will ration clients' purchases by in-
sisting that they be exclusive agents,9 not permitting their clients to purchase insurance from
other firms. We term the corresponding equilibria, exclusive contract equilibria.'0 This type
of equilibrium was first described by Pauly [1974] and is examined in Arnott and Stiglitz
[1988a].
In the other polar case, firms offer price contracts, imposing no quantity restrictions
on insurance purchases, except that negative purchases are disallowed. In the resulting price
equilibrium, if profits are zero and insurance purchases strictly positive, there will be no effort
at accident avoidance. We call this the zero profit price equilibrium." Since individuals can
choose how much insurance to purchase at the equilibrium price, equilibrium lies at the
intersection of the price-consumption line and the zero profit locus (see Figure 111.1). With
strictly positive insurance, at any point on the price-consumption line, the price line with
slope q is tangent to an indifference curve with slope Sincezero profits imply
q = atthe intersection point u'1 =— thereis full insurance. Thus, equilibrium
is at the point of intersection of the full insurance line and the zero profit locus, which we
It should be noted that to enforce exclusivity provisions, an insurance companydoes notactually have
to monitor its clients' purchases; all it has to do is make sure that it clients do not receive payouts from
other insurance companies.
Insurers could also quote customers their zero profit locus, which is essentially what Helpman and
Laffont [1975] have insurers do, but this is unnecessarily complicated.
If the quantities of goods and services consumed by the individual are observable, the insurance policy
will specify the levels of all goods or services which affect the probability of the insured-against event, either
directly or, indirectly, through an effect on e. "Thisis the price equilibrium identified in Pauly [1974].
&label throughout the paper as E.Furthermore,with full insurance, effort is zero. Hence,
the equilibrium price of insurance is qj-° (see Figure 111.1).
Because indifference curves need not be convex, there may not be an intersection of the
zero profit locus and price-consumption line,'2 in which case the price equilibrium cannot
be at the point E.Afull characterization of the price equilibrium is provided in Arnott
and Stiglitz (199Gb).Forthe purposes of this paper, it suffices to note that a unique price
equilibrium always exists, at the lowest point on the price-consumption line consistent with
non-negative profits. The equilibrium may be one of three types —azero profit price equi-
librium (zero profit, zero effort, full insurance), a positive profit price equilibrium (positive
profit, positive effort, partial insurance),'3 or a zero insurance price equilibrium. Both the
positive profit and zero insurance price equilibria occur because the price-consumption line
has a discontinuity across the zero profit locus. A positive profit price equilibrium is shown
in Figure 111.2, and a zero insurance price equilibrium in Figure 111.3.
We can use the diagrammatic apparatus to show the gains from exclusivity. In Figure
111.1, the exclusive contract equilibrium'4 occurs at 8, the point of highest utility on the zero
profit locus. The exclusive equilibrium contract is (constrained) efficient,'5 conditional on
the unobservability of effort, and clearly dominates all the price equilibria.
12 The price-consumption line is the locus of points of maximum utility for the family of price lines /3=
withq >0and a0. A point of tangency of an indifference curve and a price line /3 =qaneed not be
on the price-consumption line. First, because of the possible nonconvexity of indifference curves, there may
be multiple points of tangency —i.e.,the tangency condition picks out local extrema while only the global
maximum is on the price-consumption line. Second, a corner point, the origin, may be the point of maximal
utility on a price line.
13 Sec Figure IlL 2. Since effort decreases in the amount of insurance offered it effort is zero at H, it is
zero beyond H. This implies that the indifference curve passing through H is convex beyond H, which is
inconsistent with a jump discontinuity from H to H'. Since H is on the price-consumption line




14 Because of nonconvexities, a profitable random exclusive contract may, in some circumstances, upset
the deterministic exclusive contract equilibrium. The reason is that even though contract randomisation
perSe,by exposing the individual to additional uncertainty, is unambiguously harmful, it may cause the
individual to increase effort by so much that the firm is able to offer insurance at sufficiently more favorable
terms that utility is increased. This point is developed in Arnott and Stiglitz 11988b].
This result depends on the fact that there is a single good. With more than one good, constrained
efficiency requires that insurance contracts must, in addition, specify levels of consumption of all goods and
services; see Arnott and Stiglits (1990c).
9As noted in the introduction, when an insurance firm cannot directly control its clients'
purchases of insurance, it may try to control them indirectly. Thus, limiting the admissi-
ble contracts to only price contracts when insurance purchases ore unobservable is unduly
restrictive. It remains to be seen whether, or under what circumstances, equilibrium with
unobservable purchases coincides with the price equilibrium. Though an insurance firm can-
not monitor its clients' insurance purchases from other firms, it typically does know its own
sales and the set of insurance contracts offered by other firms, as well as clients' tastes. On
the basis of this information, it can compute how the contract it offers will affect its clients'
aggregate purchases of insurance and accordingly their effort, from which it can derive the
profitability of its contract. It is this complicated indirect control problem which is the
subject of inquiry for the remainder of the paper. We proceed with the analysis in three
steps. In the next section, we assume that all firms offer only,, quantity contracts; we refer
to an equilibrium in which only such contracts are admissible as a Q-equilibrium. In Section
V, both price and quantity contracts are admissible, and the resulting equilibria are termed
PQ-equilibria. In both these sections, we assume that only active policies are admissible —
theonly policies allowed in equilibrium are those that are actually purchased in equilibrium.
Then in Section VI, we consider PQ.equilibria with latent policies (LPQ-equilibria).
We summarize the results of this section in Proposition 1 and 2:
Proposition 1: When firms can restrict their clients' aggregate insurance purchases, the
form of competitive equilibrium is the exclusive coniract equilibrium. In
this equilibrium, firms sell a quantity contract and do not permit their
clients to purchase insurance front other finns. The equilibrium quantity
contract is Pareto efficient, conditional on the unobservability of effort,
and rations the quantity of insurance individuals may purchase at the
equilibrium price.
Proposition 2: When the class of admissible contracts is restricted to include only price
contracts, in which individuals can purchase as much insurance as they
wish at the contract price, the form of competitive equilibrium is a price
equilibrium. The price equilibrium occurs at the lowest point on the
10price-consumption line consistent with non-negative profits. The price
equilibrium is unique and is one of three types. If indifference curves
are convex (in a-3 space), the price equilibrium is a zero profit price
equilibrium (zero profit, zero effort, full insurance). When indifference
curves are nonconvex, the price equilibrium may be of this type. But if
the price-consumption line jumps across the zero profit line, it may also be
a positive profit price equilibrium (positive profit, positive effort, partial
insurance) or a zero insurance price equilibrium.
IV. (Non-Exclusive) Quantity Equilibria
We now consider the situation in which the class of admissible contracts includes only
quantity contracts. In a quantity contract, a firm may offer only one policy which specifies
both the quantity and price of insurance and which is active. Furthermore, firms cannot
monitor their clients' aggregate purchases of insurance. As a result, if an equilibrium exists,
it is a non-exclusive quantity equilibrium.
IV. 1 The nature of the problem
To provide insight, we first investigate possible quantity equilibria in which there is a sin-
gle incumbent firm. First, we shall demonstrate that, at the exclusive contract equilibrium,
as long as effort is positive —thenormal case —thereare profitable supplementary quantity
contracts which would be bought. As a result, in the normal case, the exclusive contract
equilibrium is not a quantity equilibrium. Turn to Figure IV.1, in which a ray from the
origin through the exclusive contract equilibrium point is drawn. Since at 9 the individual is
rationed in the amount of insurance he can purchase at the price q9 =j-4, asmall supple-
mentary contract (OZ in the diagram) offered at a price q such that q > will
be bought (since q) and make a profit (since q > Butsince Z lies outside the
zero profit locus, the individual's aggregate insurance purchases generate a loss. Since the
small supplementary contract 9Z makes a profit the equilibrium exclusive contract makes
a loss. The reason is that, with the additional purchase of 9Z, the individual reduces his
effort, so that while 9 broke even with effort level e9, it makes a loss with the effort level
11corresponding to the higher level of insurance with the supplementary policy Z.
By a similar argument (see Figure IV.2), when only quantity contracts are admissible
and exclusive contracts are unenforceable, a point on the zero profit locus can be a quantity
equilibrium only if the indifference curve through the point is tangent to the ray from the
origin through the point. Consider, for example, the point A' in the Figure; it can be upset
as an equilibrium by the small supplementary policy A'Z'. The slope of an indifference curve
through a point on the zero profit locus is 4,whilethe slope of a ray from the origin to
the point is There is only one point on the zero profit locus at which the two slopes are
equal, where i4 = — wherethe full insurance line intersects the zero profit locus, point
E. It can also be shown that any point in the interior of the feasibility set can be upset by
a small, supplementary quantity contract.
Is E then a (non-exclusive) quantity equilibrium, and, if it is, is it the unique equilibrium?
The answer to both questions is: Not necessarily. What we have argued is that E is the
only point which can be a quantity equilibrium if there is a single incumbent firm, since it
is the only one that cannot be upset by a small, supplementary quantity contract. We have
not shown, however, that E cannot be upset by a large quantity contract, nor that other
equilibria are not possible with more than one incumbent firm, where individuals combine
the contracts offered by different firms.
IV.2 Definition of equilibrium
Suppose there are J firms offering (non-exclusive) quantity contracts, with firm joffering
contract (a,,f3). The individual is permitted to purchase any subset of contracts, but only
one contract per firm. Where K is the index set of contracts chosen by the individual, we
define his aggregate insurance purchases to be (a,,8) (K, Eic/9k).Thena
quantiiy or Q-equili6rium is defined to be a set of active (i.e. purchased in equilibrium)
contracts, {a,,/3,}, such that: (1) all contracts at least break even; (ii) individuals may
purchase any subset of {a5,,} but only one contract per firm; (iii) taking the set of {a,,i3}
as given, there is no additional contract which, if offered by an entering firm, would make
a profit; and (iv) taking the set as given, firm i cannot increase its profits by
offering contract (a,/3) instead of
12There is potentially a vast number of such equilibria. For one thing, there may be
an infinity of market configurations which can sustain a given aggregate equilibrium. For
example, if, in equilibrium, everyone purchases (a,$'), there may be: (i) only one firm
selling (a,f3*) from which everyone buys; (ii) as many firms as individuals, each selling
(a,/?) with each firm selling a contract to only one individual; (iii) two firms, each selling
contract [i-,—1 witheveryone buying from both firms, etc. This by itself poses no great
difficulty, since one can define equilibrium in terms of individuals' aggregate purchases. But,
more problematically, there is potentially a vast number of aggregate equilibria. The set of
equilibria may be different when there are two active firms each servicing half the population
than when there is only one firm in the market, or when there are two active firms each
providing the entire population with half its aggregate purchases. And so on. We term the
number of firms in the market along with the contract each offers and the number of clients
each has, the "market structure".
Since there is no way we can characterize all possible quantity equilibria, we have chosen
to treat the case in which in equilibrium: (i) all firms supply the same contract; (ii) there are
a large number of firms with each firm supplying all of a particular individual's insurance; and
(iii) individuals are able to purchase integer multiples of the equilibrium contract (though,
by (ii), they will choose to purchase only a single contract in equilibrium). In this case, the
characterizations of equilibrium in terms of the set of contracts offered and in terms of an
individual's aggregate insurance purchases are equivalent. Thus
(&,$)isa Q-equilibrium if:
(a) f3'[i -p(e(aj3))]-a'p(e(ü',1')) U
(b) V(&,/3') ￿ V(nc,n3) for n =2,
—— —, N(the population)
(c)a policy (&,j) such that:
integer n =0,———, Nsuch that
V(ncs' + a,n$+) >V(a',i9)and
[i —p(e(na+ &, nf3 + ))J— p(e(n&+ a,nf3+ ))￿0.
In words, (,?) isa Q.equilibrium if: (a) it makes non-negative profits; (b) it is weakly
preferred to any integer multiple of itself (n =2,———, N);and (c) there is no contract
13which by itself or in combination with an integer multiple of (a,f3'),wouldincrease utility
and would not make a loss. Note that negative quantity contracts are admissible.
IV.3 Multiple purchases disallowed
To simplify the discussion, we begin by disallowing multiple purchases of the candidate
equilibrium contract. It is clear that equilibrium must lie along the zero profit locus, since
if the candidate equilibrium were strictly inside the feasibility set, there would exist a small,
supplementary policy which would be bought and be profitable. It is also easy to verify
that any equilibrium must also lie along the extended price-consumption line, the locus
of alt tangencies of the indifference curves with rays through the origin, plus the origin.
Suppose not. Then there always exists either a small, positive supplementary policy at
a "price" strictly higher than the candidate equilibrium price, which will be bought and
make a profit (though it will result in the candidate equilibrium contract making a loss) or
a small, negative16 supplementary policy at a price lower than the candidate equilibrium
price, which will be bought and make a profit (see Figure IV.2). Thus, if equilibrium exists,
it must be at a point of intersection of the extended price-consumption line and the zero
profit locus. There are only two such points —theorigin and the point E. Since at the
origin the indifference curve is steeper than the zero profit locus, there are profitable small
policies which would upset the zero insurance point as an equilibrium. Thus, when multiple
purchases are disallowed, the only candidate Q-equilibrium is the point E.
But E may not be an equilibrium. As drawn in Figure IV.2, the individual derives
a higher level of utility from purchasing the contract B, which lies below the indifference
curve through E but above the zero profit locus, than from purchasing E alone or B plus E.
Hence, if all incumbent firms were offering the contract E, an entering firm offering contract
B would attract all customers and make a profit. In this case, the contract E is not an
equilibrium because it can be upset by a large quantity contract. And by the argument of
the previous paragraph, the contract B cannot be an equilibrium either. Hence, in this case,
'°Itmay be that all large policies which are preferred to the candidate equilibrium policy and which are
profitable whenpurchasedby themselves, would be combined with the candidate equilibrium policy and
would as a result be rendered unprofitable. For this reason, small negative quantity policies are required
t., ,4ccc514v11y II pseta poi itt oilI lieicr,, pioil I I. ,i us41wItit iiI itc priCe I tie is .tccpc r Iiialltt,c i utli fferei,r r
curve(i.e., where the individual would locally prefex to purchase less insurance at that price.)
14no equilibrium exists with only quantity contracts.
It is immediate that, with multiple purchases disallowed, if there exists a point C on the
q-income-consumption line (the income-consumption line corresponding to price q) which
lies below E within the feasibility set, there does not exist a quantity equilibrium. C is strictly
preferred to E or to C combined with any quantity contract at price q, including E.
The nonexistence problem we have identified here is a property of the Nash equilibrium:
When calculating whether a new policy is viable, an entering firm assumes that offering the
new policy will not give rise to still further additions (or deletions) in the set of policies.
The problem is analogous to that discussed by Rothschild-Stiglitz [1976] and Wilson [1977]
in their analyses of insurance markets with adverse selection.
IV.4 Multiple purchases allowed
In the previous subsection, multiple purchases of the candidate equilibrium insurance
contract were excluded by assumption. Allowing such purchases requires only a minor mod-
ification in the analysis. With such purchases, there may be equilibria on the boundary of
the set for which individuals choose to purchase multiples. We term these boundary quantity
equilibria or QB-equilibria. Any small supplementary policy attempting to break such an
equilibrium will be unprofitable, because when that policy is offered, individuals purchase
multiples of the equilibrium contract and lower their level of effort substantially, rendering
the small, supplementary policy unprofitable. Thus, though effort is a continuous function
of insurance, insurance purchased may not be a continuous function of the set of insurance
policies offered. An analysis of boundary equilibria is contained in Appendix 1. In the text,
we present some of the results in:
Proposition 3:Theremay be zero, one, or many QB-equilibria. Boundary quantity equi-
libria may be characterized by zero or positive profits. Two necessary
conditions for a boundary point, C, to be such an equilibrium are that
there be no point on the qcincomeconsum•ption line below C in .1, and
that qC be less than the price of insurance in the corresponding price
equilibrium. Utility may be lower in a QB-equilibrium than in the corre-
sponding price equilibrium.
15By definition, an insurance contract for which an individual would like to purchase multi-
ples cannot be a Q-equilibrium. Boundary equilibria entail contracts for which the individual
is indifferent to purchasing multiples. That leaves contracts for which the individual strictly
prefers a single contract to multiples. We term an equilibrium corresponding to this set of
contracts an interior quantity equilibrium or a Qi-equilibrium.
It is easy to extend the arguments of the previous subsection to prove
Proposition 4: The only possible Qi-equilibrium is E, the point of intersection of the zero
profit locus and the full insurance line. Necessary conditions for E to be
a Qi-equilibrium are that it be on the price-consumption line,17 and that
all the points on the q-income-consumption line below E lie outside F.
An important implication of Propositions 3 and 4 together is:
Proposition 5: A Q-equilibrium may not exist.
It is also worth noting that if indifference curves are convex, which will be the case if risk
aversion is strong and the moral hazard relatively weak, the Q-equilibrium is unique, ii at
E, the point of intersection of the zero profit locus and the full insurance line, and coincides
with the corresponding price equilibrium. Thus, restrictions by firms on the quantity of
insurance sold to a client (as opposed to restrictions on his aggregate insurance purchases)
are ineffective.
IV.5 In retrospect
It will be helpful todraw together the principal resultsobtained thus far.
With exclusive contracts, equilibrium always exists, entails rationing and zero profits
and is (constrained) efficient conditional on the unobservability of effort.
A price equilibrium always exists and is unique. Equilibrium either (a) is at the point of
We earlier established that the Q,-equilibrium must be at an intersection of the extended price-
consumption line and the sero profit locus, and cannot be at the origin. Our analysis showed that the
unique point satisfying those conditions is E. If E is on the extended price-consumption line, but not on the
price-consumption line, there is an insurance contract, W, at the same price, on the price-consumption line,
which ii preferred to E and which makes a profit. (W offers less insurance than E, since at E and beyond
ZEL all indifference curves axe well behaved.) Since indifference curves are convex beyond E, E is preferred
to W + nE, n > 1. A foriiori, W is preferred to W + mE. Thus, W will not be supplemented by E or
multiples of E, and therefore will upset E as an equilibrium.
16intersection of the price-consumption line and the zero profit locus, (b) entails zero insurance,
or (c) entails positive profits.
A quantity equilibrium takes one of two forms: An interior equilibrium may not exist;
if it does, it coincides with the zero profit price equilibrium. There may be zero, one, or
many boundary equilibria, which do not in general lie on the price-consumption line and
may entail positive profits.
Thus, neither the price equilibrium nor quantity equilibria coincide with the exclusive
contract equilibrium; the price equilibrium may or may not "be" (coincide with) a quantity
equilibrium; and a quantity equilibrium may or may not be the price equilibrium.
We have not yet commented on the efficiency of the price and quantity equilibria, con-
ditional on the unobservability of both effort and each individual's aggregate insurance pur-
chases. In another paper, we have investigated the efficiency of the price equilibrium (Arnott
and Stiglitz [1990b]). If the government has direct control, it can obviously make a Pareto
improvement by nationalizing insurance and offering only the exclusive contract. But even
when the government has only indirect control, it can in most cases make a Pareto improve-
ment through the linear taxation of insurance.
V Price-cum-(non-exclusive) Quantity Equilibria
In the previous section, each firm was allowed to sell only one unit of a single quantity
policy to each client. In this section, we expand the set of admissible contracts to include
both price policies and (non-exclusive) quantity policies. We allow a firm to sell only one
type of policy in its contract, and in the case of quantity contracts to sell oniy one policy
to each client. Again, we require that all policies be active in equilibrium. We term an
equilibrium satisfying these requirements a price cum (non-exclusive) quantity equilibrium
or PQ-equilibrium.
V.1 Not all P-equilibria are PQ-equslzbria
A small quantity policy may upset a price equilibrium. This is an important result.
The restriction of the admissible set of contracts to only price contracts is not a natural
one. As soon as it is recognized that firms can restrict the quantity of insurance they sell to
17any customer, the relevant equilibrium concept is the PQ-equilibrium. And when quantity
contracts are admitted, some of the price equilibria cannot be sustained.
To see when a P-equilibrium is not a PQ equilibrium consider first the zero profit price
equilibrium, which we have denoted by E. Is E a PQ-equilibrium? It cannot be upset by
other price contracts; higher-price contracts would not be bought, and lower-price contracts
would operate at a loss. Can a quantity contract such as B in Figure V.1 upset E as an
equilibrium? Perhaps. Perhaps not. It depends on whether the individual would choose to
supplement B with insurance at the price q and, if so, by how much. Since the individual
can purchase both B and any quantity of insurance at the price q, he faces the budget
constraint RS. If faced with RS, the individual chooses B, then B upsets the equilibrium
point E. If, however, the individual chooses C, for example, then since C makes a loss and
the price of insurance for B is less than q, a fortiori B makes a loss. It follows that when
both price contracts and quantity contracts arc admitted, a zero profit price equilibrium can
be upset by quantity contracts if and only if part of the q'-income-consumption line below
E lies in F. An analogous result holds for the positive profit equilibrium (with price of
insurance qH)•
Consider now a zero insurance price equilibrium. At the origin, with separable, event-
independent utility, the indifference curve is steeper than the zero profit locus. Hence, there
is a small, profitable quantity contract that would be bought and upset the origin as an
equilibrium. Thus, we have
Proposition 6: Zero profit and positive profit price equilibria are PQ-equilibria if no point
on the q- and q11-iucome-consumption lines respectively, below E and H
respectively, lies in the interior of F. Zero insurance price equilibria are
not PQ-equilibria.
V.2 All Q.equilibria are PQ-equilibria
Since Q-equilibria must be able to survive any new quantity policy, they surely must
be able to survive a price policy. Assume otherwise —thata price policybreaks the
equilibrium. In breaking the equilibrium a particular quantity of that price policy would
be purchased; the corresponding quantity policy would then have broken the equilibrium as
18well.
V.3 Other PQ-equilibria
Are there other possible PQ-equilibria? If there are, any such equilibrium must entail in-
dividuals purchasing both a quantity policy (à,B) and a price policy .Denotethe purchases
of the price policy by (&,.8). If a PQ-equilibrium exists which is neither a P-equilibrium
nor a Q-equilibrium, the quantity policy must have a strictly lower price than .Thus,if
the quantity policy makes non-negative profits, the price policy must make strictly positive
profits. This obviously provides an incentive for a firm to offer a lower price policy. For
(a,/3)(&+à,/3 + 3) to be a PQ-equilibrium, it must therefore be a boundary equihb-
rium in the sense that reducing the price of the price policy causes the individual to purchase
multiples of (&,/3)and thereby renders the price policy unprofitable. Furthermore, there can
be no small, utility-improving supplementary policy which is profitable.
Turn to Figure V.2. It displays the insurance possibility set as well as a variety of
contracts. (a, /3) is the candidate PQ-equilibrium. (a', /3') is the individual's aggregate
insurance purchase when he combines two quantity contracts with his preferred amount of
the price insurance. As drawn, the individual is indifferent between (&,/?)and(a', /31)and
strictly prefers either point to any other point in the insurance possibility set. Assume that
the utility gradient is steeper in all directions at (a',f3') than at (a, /3). Then if the price
of insurance is lowered slightly from ,theindividual will switch from purchasing one unit of
(a,3)to two. Assume that this renders the price insurance unprofitable. Furthermore if any
small, utility-improving (price less than .)supplementarypolicy is offered, the individual
will switch from purchasing one unit of (&,8) to two. Assume that this renders the small,
supplementary policy unprofitable. Hence, there can be PQ-equilibria that are neither P-
equilibria nor Q-equilibria. We term these mixed equilibria or M-equilibria since they entail
individuals mixing price and quantity contracts. We shall omit a formal characterization of
mixed equilibria. It should be evident, however, that there may be many such equilibria or
there may be none.
We have thus proved
Proposition 7: All Q-equilibria are PQ-equilibria. The set of PQ-equilibria includes Q-
19equilibria (when they exist), plus the positive profits price equilibrium
(when it exists) provided the q11-income-consumption line below H lies
everywhere outside ,plusmixed equilibria.
VI. Income-Consumption Lines and the Feasibility Set
A central requirement for the existence of Q- and PQ-equilibria involved the relevant
income-consumption line below the candidate equilibrium point never being inside the fea-
sibility set. In this section, we investigate this requirement.
VI.1 Qi.equilibriurn
The Qj-equilibrium, when it exists, is at the point we have denoted by E, the intersection
of the zero profit locus and the full insurance line.
Since at E, q =qi) and effort is zero along the full insurance line, all points
on the full insurance line are on the extended q-income-consumption line, the locus of all
tangency points.of lines with slope q to indifference curves. Since E is on the full insurance
line and is, by assumption, on the q-income-consumption line, a necessary condition for part
of the q-income-consumption line below E to lie in F is that there be a discontinuity in the
q-income-consumption line below E. Such a discontinuity is shown in Figure VI.1, where,
as the price line with slope q moves to the right, the q-income-consumption line jumps
from C' to C. Arnott and Stiglitz [1988aJ show that the jump will occur in this direction if
pG(4)G > pGt(i4)GI
Diagrammatically, we can see that the direction of the discontinuity depends on whether
the indifference curves are closer together below C than below C' If they are, a given
rightward parallel shift in the budget constraint will increase utility more near C than near
C'. 18
VI.2PQ_equilibrium corresponding to the positive profit price equilibrium
When it exists, the PQ-equilibrium corresponding to the positive profit price equilibrium
occurs at the lower jump point at the price, at which: (i) the price-consumption line
'Formally,we need onlycalculate the derivativeof utility along the (extended) income-consumption line
near G and G'. If it is greater near G than near C', then there is an inward discontinuity. The derivative of
utility along the (extended) income-consumption line is just pt4.
20jumps across the zero profit locus; and (ii) for all lower prices, the price-consumption line
lies strictly outside the feasibility set. Points of discontinuity of the price-consumption line
and the corresponding (i.e., corresponding to the price at which the discontinuity occurs)
income-consumption line coincide. In Figure 111.2 H is the positive profits price equilibrium.
For H to be a PQ-equilibrium, the corresponding income-consumption line below H must
lie strictly outside the feasibility set; thus, both the price- and income-consumption lines
must jump outwards, from H to H'. In the Figure, the price-consumption line jumps from
H to H'. Arnott and Stiglitz [1988J show that the price-consumption line jumps outwards19
if ,H(,4)HH < pH'(uli)H'aH' and in the opposite direction if the inequality is reversed.
Since a' > aFI, the condition for an iiiward movement in the income-consumption line,
pH(uli)H > p"(t4)", and an outward movement in the price-consumption line are not
inconsistent. Hence, a positive profits price equilibrium may or may not be a PQ-equilibrium.
Figure VI.2 provides an example in which there is an outward discontinuity in the price-
consumption line, but an inward discontinuity in the income-consumption line.
The intuition underlying this result is that for an outward discontinuity in the price-
consumption line, the indifference curves near H' need not be quite as close as they would
be for an outward discontinuity in the income-consumption line.
Note that the direction of the discontinuities in both lines depend on global rather than
local properties, i.e. on a comparison of the values of accident probabilities and marginal
utilities at two, quite distinct, points in a —/3space.
VII. Inactive and Latent Policies
In the preceding sections, we required that all policies present in equilibrium be active,
i.e. be purchased. This might seem a reasonable requirement, particularly when account is
taken of the costs associated with drawing up policies. We also required that each insurance
firm may offer only one policy. However, when both assumptions are relaxed, a new class of
equilibria arises in which firms use inactive policies to supplement their active policies so as
to deter entry; we have termed inactive policies employed for this purpose latent policies.
19Thecondition for an inward or outward discontinuity in the price-consumption tine is derived in the
same manner as that for the income-consumption line. We simply determine whether the derivative of utility
along the extended price-consumption line near H is greater or less than that near H'.
21VII.1 Inactive policies
To start, we admit inactive policies but continue to require that each firm may offer
only a single policy. We now show that the set of equilibria may be expanded when inactive
policies are admitted. To simplify the argument, we assume that the market structure is
such that there is only one incumbent firm in the market olfering a quantity contract. We
proceed by demonstrating an (a, j3) that can be an equilibrium when inactive policies are
admitted, but not otherwise.
Turn to Figure VII.1 B =(a,i3) is any point having the properties that: (i) it is the
lowest point on the income-consumption line corresponding to price in the interior of .1;
(ii) there is a jump discontinuity in the income-consumption line at b(theupper jump point
is labelled E);(iii)insurance at price loses money at bandat all points beyond Eonthe
ti-income-consumption line; and (iv) '> .
Supposethat, as assumed, there is a single firm offering the quantity policy (a, Th
withthe remaining incumbent firms offering a price policy at price .Since(&,/3) is on
the k-income-consumption line and>,individualswill purchase the quantity policy
but not the price policy —theprice policy is inactive. We know from before that (a, fi)
cannotbe a Q-equilibrium, since when only quantity contracts are admitted, (á,/3) can
be upset by a small, supplementary policy. We wish to show that (&,J3) is, however, an
equilibrium when the inactive i-price policies are present. We need to demonstrate that
Ecanbe upset by neither an entering quantity policy nor an entering price policy. If an
entering quantity policy is bought, it must have price less than ,say,andthe individual's
aggregate insurancE purchases, B, must lie on the -income-consumption line beyond B (if
the in&vidual purchases a positive amount of the price insurance).20 Since lPtA)>>
the entering quantity policy loses money. If an entering price policy upsets E,itmust be
bought in some quantity, in which case the corresponding quantity policy would also upset
B. But this cannot be. Hence, no entering price policy can upset B either, and B is therefore
an equilibrium.
" A slight modification of the argument handles the casein which theindividual would like to purchase
a negative amount of price insurance, but is unable to do so because of the non-negativity requirement on
purchases of price insurance.
22VII.2Latent policies
In the previous subsection, we restricted firms to offering a single policy. It should be
apparent from the above analysis that as soon as this restriction is dropped, firms may
choose to use inactive policies to protect their active policies; for instance, in the example
of the previous subsection, a firm could use the price policy ?jtoprotect the quantity policy
(a, /3).Weterm inactive policies used for this purpose latent policies, and equilibria in
which they are employed latent policy or LPQ.equilibrium. A latent policy may be either a
price or quantity policy, and firms may employ more than one latent policy. To simplify, we
assume that each firm allows individuals to purchase the policies it offers separately, without
restriction.
VII.2.1 Monopoly equilibrium
We begin the analysis by considering a market structure in which a single insurance
firm sells insurance to all individuals, but there are no barriers to entry—other than those
posed by the firm's latent policies. Consider a policy B in(see Figure VII.2). Assume
that the firm offers this policy, plus a latent quantity policy BL such that L lies on the
indifference curve through B, but beyond F. Since BL is latent, B is preferred to BL.
A necessary condition for B to be an LPQ-equilibrium —i.e.,for B to be protected by BL
—isthat every small, supplementary policy, which when combined with B is profitable and
utility-improving, is in fact combined with L and thereby rendered unprofitable. Small, sup-
plementary policies which when combined with B are both profitable and utility-improving
have price r satisfying
> > . (VII.1)
(1—p)u0 B 1—p
Thus, BL protects B against small, supplementary contracts if:
(i) The utility gradient at V is steeper than that at B, i.e.
(V + rVp)L.>(V + rl)s. , (VI1.2)
for all r satisfying (Viii). If (ViI.2) is satisfied, when a small, supplementary policy satisfy-
ing (VII.i) is offered, the individual will purchase the small, supplementary policy plus the




between B and V and for all r satisfying (Viii). Equation (VII.3) may be rewritten as
fl()
(t4+ rt4) > A1 + rA0 (VII.3')
where A1—b-.Hence(VII.3) is more likely to hold the more rapidly effort falls as
one moves up the indifference curve, and the lower the degree of absolute risk aversion.
Furthermore, (VII.3) holds if the indifference curve, 1/o, is weakly concave, and * >
everywhere between B and L.
(ii) All small, supplementary policies satisfying (Viii) make a loss at L', i.e.
(r .c) cF . (VII.4)
(1—p)u0Jp- Li—p L
Thiscondition will be satisfied if,forexample, (()V)Bcq'andVliesbeyond the
zeroeffort line, so that [fjJL- =q'.Appendix 2 provides a simple constructive method for
determining the set of BL which protect B' against small, supplementary contracts for a
particular class of utility functions.
Several comments are in order. First, even if BL' protects B' against small, supple-
mentary policies, it may not protect B' against large policies (or against price policies).
Second, if B'L' protects B against only a subset of small, supplementary policies, it may
be possible to protect B' against the remaining small, supplementary policies by introducing
additional latent policies along V0. Third, if B is "strictly" protected by B'L' in the sense
that no small policy "very nearly" upsets B', then all the points in the neighborhood of B'
are also protected against entry by small policies.
We now investigate conditions under which a policy may be protected from the entry of
a large policy. New, large entering policies may upset B either as supplements to B' or as
replacements for it. To simplify the analysis, we assume that B' is at the exclusive contract
equilibrium, in which case there is no profitable policy which replace3 B'. This allows us to
focus on large, supplementary policies.
24We start by constructing the set of large policies that are profitable when combined with
0. Turn to Figure VH.3. Draw a line through 0 with slope betweenand (
suchas WX in the diagram. Next draw the ray from the origin parallel to WX and mark
its point of intersection with the ZPL by S. Now draw the constant effort locus through
5 and mark its point of intersection with WX by T. The claim is that 9T is the largest
policy at the price given by the slope of WX, 4,thatis profitable when combined with 9.
The proof is as follows: At 5, 4= () = sinceS is on the ZPL. Since T and 5 are
on the same constant effort line, =(i-)THence, (i1)T =4, andtherefore zero
profits are made on the policy UT, positive profits on smaller policies at the same price, and
negative profits on larger policies. Repeating the procedure for all q 6 ((j.)g, (Iv,)g)
generatesthe set of large policies2' that are profitable when combined with 0, which is the
lozenge in the Figure.
Next slide the lozenge along the indifference curve until one finds a point say Z at which:
(i) the utility gradient is steeper at every point in the moved lozenge than in the original
lozenge; and (ii) every supplementary policy in the moved lozenge makes a loss. Then the
latent policy OZ will protect S from entry by large, supplementary policies. If there is no
single latent policy which satisfies these conditions, then more than one latent policy may
protect 0.
It is evidently difficult to specify conditions under which 0 is protected by latent poli-
cies, since these conditions depend on global rather than local properties of the utility and
probability-of-accident functions. It is even more difficult to specify conditions under which
points other than 0 are protected by latent policies, since one has to consider large re-
placement policies as well as large supplementary policies. However, the conditions for
entry-deterring latent policies do not seem very restrictive.
A further point is that if there is a latent policy which strongly protects 0 (in the sense
that all large policies that are profitable when combined with 9 make a strictly positive
loss with the latent policy present), then by continuity there is a dense set of points inside
the feasibility set near 0 that can be protected by latent policies, including points at which
21Theprocedure is slightly more complicated if V9 is nonconvex near 9 since then there mny be large
profitable supplementary policies at a price greater than
25positive profits are made. Label the set of policies in the feasibility set that are protected
by latent policies P. Then the monopoly insurer will choose the most profitable policy in
P. Thus, in insurance markets with effective latent policies, potential entry ensures neither
economic efficiency nor zero profits. Effective latent policies serve to discourage entry, even
when the single insurance carrier is making strictly positive profits.
VII.2.2 Duopoly equili6rium
With two firms, there is a much richer set of possible LPQ equilibria. Indeed, any point
in. the set P is an LPQ equilibrium. And in general, the set P is a dense set—in terms
of Fig. VII.2, if B is strictly protected by BL in the sense that no policy very nearly
upsets B, then all the points in the neighborhood of B are also protected. Hence, there
will generically be a dense set of LPQ-equilibria.
Assume that both firms are offering the policy B and the associated latent policy BL,
and that at B there are strictly positive profits. By the definition of B, no firm can offer
a new policy and make a profit. Assume that the second firm tried to steal customers away
from the first by offering a more attractive policy. Then the first firm's latent policy would
come into effect, resulting in the second firm.making a loss. On the other hand, if the second
firm tried to increase its profits by offering a less attractive policy to its customers, they
would all switch to the rival.
VII.2.3 The discrete activity case
Turn to Figure VII.4. In this case the individual undertakes the safe activity for low
levels of insurance and the risky activity for high levels —4"separates the two regions
and lies below the full insurance line. Now suppose a monopoly firm offers both the active
policy B' which is in F "just below" 4"onV0, and the latent policy B'M' such that M'
is outside F "just beyond" 4''onVo. Algng Vo from B' to M', (Va + rVp)v0 increases
discontinuously across 4''.Hence,ifand M' are sufficiently close, the utility gradient
is unambiguously steeper at M' than at B'. Thus, any small, supplementary policy which
would be profitable and utility-improving when combined with B', would in fact be combined
with M'. Furthermore, since profit also falls discontinuously across 4'",B'and M' can be
26chosen so that any such small, supplementary policy would be rendered unprofitable. Since
the same argument applies to finite replacement policies near B', it is possible to choose
and M' so that any quantity policy which is utility-improving compared to B' and by itself
is profitable (the cross-hatched area in Figure VII.4) is rendered unprofitable by the latent
policy. By an earlier argument, if B' cannot be upset by a quantity policy, it cannot be
upset by a price policy either. Similar results hold provided that there is a discrete number
of activities.
We summarize this section in
Proposition 8: Latent policies can serve to deter entry. If there is a discrete number of
activities, there is always a dense set P of active policies that can be
protected by latent policies. If there is a single firm in the market, there
is a unique LPQ-equilibrium —theprofit-maximizing policy in P —in
which the firm makes monopoly profit. If there is more than one firm in
the market, every point in P is an LPQ-equilibrium and in such equilibria
most firms make positive profits. With continuous effort in the model, the
set P may be empty, but if it is not, the characteristics of LPQ-equilibria
are the same as in the discrete activity case.
Latent policies can be thought of as a form of commitment by the incumbent firm to
respond either to the entry of a new firm or to a deviation from equilibrium behavior by a
rival. It is a form of response which, in this generalized contract space, gives rise to what
may be viewed as a kinked demand curve.
It should be observed, however, that even if the firm could renege on its latent policy
offers, it is not necessarily the case that it would want to. That is, some of the equilibria we
have described are perfect equilibria. This is seen most clearly in the two activity case. We
showed that any contract near the switchline (point B') is in the set 7', and there always
exist latent contracts B'M' with slope steeper than p/(l— p),which serve to deter entry
and which would make a profit should entry occur.
VIII. Extensions and Comments
27Two of the central results of our paper have been to show that, in the absence of la-
tent policies there may be no Nash equilibrium, while with latent policies there may be a
multiplicity of equilibria, some of which entail strictly positive profits.
Whenever one obtains a nonexistence result, one needs to question the behavioral and
technological assumptions employed in the model as well as the equilibrium concept. Sim-
ilarly, whenever one obtains a multiplicity of equilibria, one needs to examine carefully the
equilibrium concept, to see whether there is a missing equilibrium condition, or a natural
refinement of the equilibrium concept.
Much of this paper has been concerned with exploring these issues. In this section, we
comment on the three essential ingredients of our analysis, the set of admissible contracts,
the market structure, and the equilibrium concept.
VIII.1 The set of admissible contracts
Our analysis has shown that the existence and nature of equilibrium is dependent on the
set of admissible contracts. We have proceeded by analyzing equilibrium under alternative
assumptions concerning this set. We do not, however, take an agnostic view concerning
which of these assumptions is the most relevant. We would argue that: (i) in most insurance
markets, there are important dimensions of effort (accident avoidance activities) which can-
not be directly monitored, and accordingly moral hazard (incentive) issues are important;
(ii) in many insurance markets exclusive contracts are not feasible; and (iii) restricting the
set to include only price policies is unjustifiably restrictive. That is why we have focused on
quantity equilibria; at least in many instances, a firm can and does make inferences concern-
ing what other insurance a client might buy from other firms on the basis of the quantity of
insurance which he purchases from itself.
We are less sure concerning the relevance of latent policy equilibria, but to the extent
that they are not important, a question is posed; What accounts for this?2223
22 One possible suggestion is thatto the extent that latent policiesreduceentry, they are providing a
public good. If there are any costs associated with offering such policies, a representative firm may choose to
free ride. Relatedly, if there is any cost to offering such policies, they cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies, since with such policies, there is no entry, and with no entry, it does not pay to offer such
policies.
In an earlier version of this paper, we examined the consequences of expanding the set of admissible
28VIII.2 Market structure
The inference that a firm can draw from an individual's purchase of its insurance policy
depends, as in Rothschild-Stiglitz [19761, on the set of other insurance policies being offered.
For example, if it were the only insurance firm in the market, it would not need to worry
about individuals purchasing multiples of any quantity which it offered; it would, of course,
still have to be concerned with the entry of new firms.
We have investigated the market structure which we believe to be the most relevant,
where individuals typically buy all their insurance from one firm,24 but in which they could
purchase additional (multiple) insurance contracts from other firms. This, we suspect, pro-
duces the most efficient outcome, subject to the non-observability constraints. Other market
structures yield different equilibria, as Hellwig's [1983b} analysis emphasized.
The market structure should, itself, be endogenous. One of the interesting and impor-
tant results of Section VII.2 is that there are multiple equilibrium market structures. We
characterized, for instance, both a monopoly equilibrium (in which latent policies protected
the monopolist from the threat of entry) as well as a dense set of duopoly equilibria.
With many insurance firms, one needs to enquire into firms' incentives for communicating
information concerning quantities of insurance purchased. Hdllwig [1983a] showed that in
the absence of communication costs, a full communication equilibrium is not possible. If it
were, it would be the exclusive contract equilibrium. But in this candidate equilibrium each
firm would profit by cheating.
VIII.3 Equilibrium concept
contracts beyond that considered heie, by the introduction of stochastic insurance policies and negative
price insurance. In Arnott and Stiglits [1988b] we noted that the non-convexities associated with moral
hazard (and other principal-agent problems) may, under not too restrictive conditions, lead to stochastic
insurance policies of a variety of forms. Again, one needs to ask why we do not observe such policies. What
implications does this fact have for our theories? Here, we simply note that one form of randomization of
price insurance—where effort and the quantityofins,,rance are decided upon alter the price of insurance
is announccd—sufllciently convexifies the problem that positive profit price equilibria are eliminated; This
z,iay not be true, however, of other forms of randomization.
Though individuals will never purchase negative insurance in the aggregate, the possibility of negative
insurance policies may alter the set of equilibria, because it may expand both the set of potentially profitable
entering policies and the set of deterrent policies.
24Inaddition, for most of the analysis, we have assumed that any insurance firm can offer only one (active)
insurance policy. This restriction was made mainly to simplify the analysis; so long as latent policies are
allowed, the structure ofthe equilibrium is not affected if firms can offer multiple active policies.
29We have employed the standard Nash equilibrium concept with a one-period model in
which all insurance firms make their offers simultaneously. Insurance firm A cannot react
to firm B's offers by, for example, withdrawing a policy it had previously offered, or offering
additional policies. These reactions were critical in the earlier analysis of insurance with
self-selection. While Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976] discussed a variety of possible reaction
equilibria, Wilson [1977] focused on one particular reaction equilibrium in which insurance
firms were allowed to eliminate existing policies but not add new ones. Two criticisms were
levelled at these reaction equilibria: They seemed outside the spirit of competitive markets;
any small firm could induce large reactions by all other firms, and firms took this into
account in their initial action. And the restrictions on the admissible (re)actions seemed
unpersuasive.
Similar issues arise here. Clearly, a firm could react to the offer of a supplementary
policy by another carrier (if this were observable) by withdrawing its original policy. While
in the model with adverse selection this makes the new policy unprofitable, here this reaction
increases the profitability of the new policy. Hence, this form of reaction makes it easier to
break the equilibrium, making the set of equilibria smaller.
Latent policies can be interpreted as a mechanism for introducing reactions into a static
model, since a latent policy becomes active only when other firms take actions attempting
to break the initial equilibrium.
More recently, dynamic games, in which these reactions can be modeled as part of
equilibrium strategies, have been formulated by Heliwig [1987] and by Stiglitz and Weiss
11987]. Similar dynamic games could presumably be formulated here. Though this eliminates
some of the formal objections to these reaction function equilibria, the economic issues, e.g.
whether these equilibria are consistent with a competitive market, remain.
The existence problems which we have encountered are associated with the nonconvexity
of indifference curves (in benefit-premium space). While the assumption of convex indiffer-
ence curves is natural in the context of choice over goods, with moral hazard the standard
convexity assumptions do not rule out nonconvex indifference curves in benefit-premium
space. Indeed, when there is a finite number of different effort levels which individuals
30choose (or any linear combination thereof), indifference curves in benefit-premium space are
never convex. The standard way to remedy nonconvex indifference curves is to assume a
continuum of traders, which smooths out the nonconvexities by aggregation. That will not
work here, however. Our analysis is completely unaffected by aggregation if all individuals
are identical. Nor will assuming that individuals differ help. Either individual differences
are observable, in which case contracts will be written contingent on these characteristics,
and our analysis applies to each separate group with a particular set of characteristics; or
else these differences are not observable, and problems of adverse selection arise, which al-
ter the nature of the problem. Moreover, the existence problems discussed in this paper are
distinct from those uncovered by Rothschild and Stiglitz [19761andWilson [1977j in the con-
text of adverse selection. There, possible nonexistence arose when the quantity of insurance
purchased by each individual was observable. Nonexistence in this paper, however, occurs
only when clients' aggregate insurance purchases are unobservable. The mechanism causing
nonexistence is that, for every feasible equilibrium configuration, there is always a profitable
new contract that can be introduced, and is in this sense similar to that of Rothschild-Stiglitz
(1976) and Wilson (1977).
VIIL4 Other critical assumptions
We should comment briefly on some of the structural assumptions of our model. We
have abstracted from adverse selection and assumed a single period. Extending the model
to incorporate these features will alter the structure of the problem. For example, in a
multi-period model, the terms at which insurance is offered in later periods may be made
contingent upon performance in earlier periods. While this mitigates the moral hazard, it
does not, with discounting, eliminate it, and the possible nonexistence of equilibrium we
have identified remains.
The simultaneous treatment of adverse selection and moral hazard, meanwhile, com-
pounds the existence problems. We also assumed that consumers are perfectly informed
concerning the set of available insurance policies. When consumers are imperfectly informed,
the market may become monopolistically competitive and equilibrium may always exist.25
In some versions of sequential search models (Diamond [1971j) equjlibrium (contract or price) is identical
31Finally, we assumed that firms are perfectly informed concerning profit opportunities and
would enter, and perhaps upset, equilibrium, even when the profitable niche and the profits
to be gained were arbitrarily small. Introducing noise into firms' information sets and/or
costs of altering policies might also remedy nonexistence.
Concluding Remarks
This paper belongs to the literature addressing the question of how to design contracts
to mitigate the effects of moral hazard and the implications of such contracts for equilibrium
and welfare. This literature includes the extensive principal-agent literature (in which the
principal maximizes his expected utility subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
and the individual rationality or reservation utility constraints of the agents).
In insurance markets, even though insurance firms cannot directly control the actions of
the insured, they can affect his actions by, for instance, limiting the amount of insurance or
threatcningto terminate his insurance if he has too bad an accident record. Such quantitative
restrictions play an important role in other markets, including capital markets, where lenders
may try to limit the amount of funds borrowed by any borrower, and labor markets. But the
effectiveness of these quantitative restrictions imposed by a firm on its customers depends on
its ability to enforce them, which in turn depends, at least in part, on the market environment
and on the observability of purchases.
This paper is concerned with showing how moral hazard considerations affect market
equilibrium, in the central case in which a firm cannot observe the insurance that an indi-
vidual purchases from others,butin which it can, quite naturally, observe the purchases an
individual makes from itself. We assume that there are a large number of potential entrants,
and that there are no costs of entry.
Market equilibrium, when it exists, looks distinctly different from that depicted by the
standard Arrow-Debreu model. Equilibrium will be characterized by firms offering fixed
quantity policies, rather than quoting prices and allowing customers to choose the quantity
of insurance purchased. The intent of these quantitative restrictions is rather different from
that analyzed in the earlier moral hazard literature; it is not so much to ration insurance
to that of pure monopoly.
32purchases as to discourage the purchase of policies from other insurance firms (in effect,
to ration the total purchases of insurance.) In most cases, the quantitative restrictions
take the form of requiring large purchases. Yet, though equilibrium always entails these
quantitative constraints, in the absence of latent policies the equilibrium (when it exists)
normally coincides with the zero profit price equilibrium (when that is the equilibrium price
contract.)
The nonexistence problem which we have noted depends on the nonconvexity of the
indifference curves, and arises whenever the discontinuity in income-consumption curves
takes on a particular form, which, we have argued, it may quite plausibly have.
But while without latent policies equilibrium may plausibly not exist, with latent policies
there are likely to be multiple equilibria, most of which entail strictly positive profits.
What light does our analysis cast on actual insurance markets and other markets in
which moral hazard is important? Several stylized facts seem pertinent. First, many types
of insurance (in particular fire insurance and health insurance, but not all accident insurance)
in which moral hazard plays an important role are characterized by an exclusivity provision.
Similarly, labor contracts in which moral hazard is important attempt to mitigate its effects
by imposing restrictions on the quantity of insurance provided. Exclusivity provisions are
absent only for insurance against those accidents for which moral hazard is unimportant,
notably death (life insurance) and air flight accidents (air flight insurance). Second, such
restrictions are only partly successful. While health insurance contracts may be able to
restrict the insurance an individual can purchase from other insurance carriers, they cannot
effectively restrict the insurance provided by employers (time off without loss of pay) or
the implicit insurance provided by family and friends.26 One context in which exclusivity
provisions are particularly difficult to monitor is the credit market. Even though in the
case of consumer credit, an attempt is made to monitor borrowing behavior and the extent
of current liabilities, little attempt is made to restrict future access to credit; and since
the typical loans are small, the price-equilibrium model may be the most relevant to this
market. For other forms of credit, however, institutional arrangemcuts in banking often serve
26InArnott and Stiglits [1990a] we analyze he conditions under which such insurance is welfare-enhancing.
33to maintain exclusivity, while in bond markets seniority provisions may serve as at least a
partial substitute.
Moral hazard is a pervasive phenomenon in our economy, arising not only in formal in-
surance markets, but also in labor, capital, and product markets. A persuasive analysis of
competitive equilibrium should take it into account. In this paper, we investigated competi-
tive equilibrium with moral hazard, and found that it differs in important respects from the
conventional analysis. In particular, we have seen how the price mechanism of conventional
market analysis no longer applies. We have analyzed these problems in the context of the
simplest model in which moral hazard/incentive issues can arise. The problems that arise
in that model have real-life counterparts; there is a rich set of institutionalarrangements
which have evolved in a variety of contexts to deal with them. An investigation of these
arrangements will serve both to enrich our understanding of economics and of the relevance
of alternative theoretical constructs.
34Appendix 1
Boundary Q-Equilibria
Analyzing such equilibria requires some new definitions. Define
S ={(c,13)IV(a,i3)>V(rra, nfl) V integer 71>i}
to be the set of contracts such that the individual sricüy prefers the contract to any integer
multiple of that contract. Define S to be the corresponding weakly-preferred set, and
S— S.Note that (i) S, SandS need not be connected sets; (ii) (0,0) e 8; and (iii)
no point not in Scanbe an equilibrium. We call Q-equilibria which lie in , "boundary
equilibria" or QB-equilibria. Similarly, we call equilibria which lie in S "interior equilibria"
or Qi-equilibria.
Figure A.1 illustrates a policy M for which the individual is indifferent between buying
one (M) and two (2M) policies. Note that if the indifference curves are not bunched together
much more loosely at 2M than they are at M, and if a policy M', with slightly more insurance
than the policy M, were to be offered, the individual would prefer 2M' to M'. That is why
M is on the boundary of the set S.
Itis possible that there are equilibria on the boundary of the set at which individuals
purchase multiple insurance policies. Turn to Figure A.2. Sisthe set of boundary points
of the connected subsets of S.Theonly points in S which cannot necessarily be upset by
either a small profitable supplementary contract or a profitable replacement contract are the
points of maximal utility in each subset of S fl F, such as D and D' in Figure A.2.5 Thus,
one necessary condition for a point Ctobe a boundary Q-equilibrium is that it be a point
of maximal utility in a connected subset of S flF.
Another necessary condition is that there be no point in the interior of F on the qC
income-consumption line below C. Suppose there were such a point, R. Then if contract R
were offered, it would be bought since it provides a higher level of utility than C. Further-
more, since R is on the qcincomeconsumption line, the individual would not supplement it
with C or a multiple of C, and R would be profitable. Hence, R would upset C.
*Ifthe indifference curve is tangent to the boundary, it implies that, in Figure A.1, the slope of the
indifference curve at 2M is identical to that at M. (max0,fl V(a,) s. t. V(Q,/3) =V(2a,2/3)).
35A third necessary condition is that the implicit price in any Q-equilibrium must be no
higher than in the corresponding P-equilibrium. Assume the contrary, and let z denote the
Q8-equ.ilibrium contract and y aggregate purchases in the P-equilibrium. Suppose the econ-
omy is at the Q-equilibrium with only quantity contracts admitted, and that an entering
firm offers y as a quantity contract. The individual would prefer y to z or to y + mx, ￿ 1,
because p is the most preferred point on a lower price line. Since v would also break even
or make a profit, it would upset z.
While the price associated with a Q5-equilibrium can be no higher than that in the
P-equilibrium, welfare may be lower. A Qs-equilibrium may not be broken by the P-
equilibrium contract (the (cx, j3)purchasedin the P-equilibrium) even though the latter is
associated with a higher level of welfare, since the individual may choose to supplement the
P-equilibrium contract with multiple purchases of the QB-equilibrium contract resulting in
the P-equilibrium contract making a loss. Thus, while exclusive contracts which restrict the
aggregate quantities of insurance purchased are welfare-enhancing, quantity restrictions by
firms on only their own sales of insurance need not be.
We summarize the results of the Appendix in Proposition 3 in the text.
36Appendix 2
Construction of latent policies against small, supplementary contracts
We assume that the utility function has the form -(U~ = a constant. Then (VII.3')
reduces to the condition that the indifference curve be concave, and (VII.2) to the condition
that the line tangent* to B* lie below r*. Turn to Figure A.3. The set of points on Vo
satisfying (VII.2) and (VIlA) is XYZ. To demonstrate this: First, draw the ray from the
origin parallel to the tangency line at B* and label its intersection point with the ZPL, W.
By construction, (~IVO)B" = ((1~;lu~)B' = (~)w =(t:p)w' Next, draw the constant effort
line through Wand extend it back to Vo, cutting Vo at T. Byconstruction (t:p)T = (t:p)w.
Since effort falls as one moves out along an indifference curve, for any point beyond Ton Vo,
(VIlA) is satisfied. Thus, both (VII.2) and (VIlA) are satisfied for all points on Vo between
X and Z.
* 11,. + TV~ = (Va + TV~)B' along the line tangent to the indifference curve at B".
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Figure It.l: Basic diagram 1, continuum of effort levels
i) the zero profit locus is B(l—p)—apO
ii) the feasibility set is never convex








zero effort line (ZEL)
ci
Figure tl.2: Basic diagram 2, continuwn of effort levels
i)effort is zero beyond the zero effort line





iii) beyond the zero effort line, indifference
curves are strictly convex
zero profit locus (PL)






Figure 11.3: Basic diagram 3, two effort levels
Observe: The safe act :vity is under-
taken for (a,B) below
the risky activity above
is the set of (a,t3) which
generate utility V0, contin-
gent on the safe activity, etc.
33(1_pS)_aSpSO is the zero
profit locus, contingent on
the safe activity




— zero profit locus
V0,V1 indifference curves
-,—..price-consumptionline
Figure 111.1: Even where the price-consumption line is continuous
and intersects the zero profit locus, the price
"equilibrium" is dominated by the quantity contract 8-
theexclusive contract equilibrium.











Figure 111.3: Zero insurance price equilibrium. Observe that








Figure IV.l:The exclusive contract equilibrium cannot be sustained







Figure IV.2:No point on the zero profit Locus for which the
indifference curve through the point is not tangent to the
ray from the origin through the point can be an equilibrium
when only quantity contracts are admissible and exclusive
contracts are unenforceable. The individual would choose
to supplement CA' with theprofitablecontract A'Z', and



























Figure V.2: (a,8*) can be a mixed equilibrium./3









Figure VI.2:The price-conSuJptiOfl line can
















Figure VII.2: Investigation of latent policies. For B*L*
to protect B* against small, supplementary
policies, the utility gradient between the
directions characterized by arrows®and® must be steeper at L* than at 8*.
0V9
Figure VlI.3: Construction of the Set of large, profitable
supplementary policies.
set of large, profitable supplementary policies
ZPL
'S3


















Figure A.2:0, a point of maximal uti.lity on a
connected subset of I(',maybe a
even though it is on
neither the ZN.northe price-consump-




Figure A.3:Construction of the set of latent policies which
protect B against small, supplementary policies.
'Jo
set of latent policies for fl*
ZLI
1
'4-e